TL 4015-10

Indonesia and the Malay World, No. 71, 1997

VII JORNADAS DE TIMOR DA UNIVERSIDADE DO PORTO

FROM NETHERLANDS INDIES TO INDONESIA — FROM PORTUGUESE TIMOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF EAST TIMOR/TIMOR LORO SA'E: TWO PATHS TO NATIONHOOD AND INDEPENDENCE[1]

PETER CAREY

Introduction

In August 1995, Indonesians celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of their independence from the Dutch. In the same month, the East Timorese recalled a less happy anniversary: the outbreak of the August 1975 civil war, which led eventually to the 28 November 1975 Fretilin (*Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente*) unilateral declaration of independence, and the 7 December 1975 Indonesian invasion of the former Portuguese territory. All in that Indonesian jubilee year, were twenty years old.

For historians of modern Indonesia, there is a deep irony in contemplating the juxtaposition of these two, very different, sets of anniversaries. One wonders what the early founders of Indonesian nationalism would have made of it all: a once colonized people celebrating their half-century of independence, while, on the borders of their republic, a newly annexed territory marked two decades of colonial rule. Certainly, Suwardi Suryaningrat (1889-1959) would have recognized the poignancy of the moment. For it was he who, in July 1913, when the Dutch had had the temerity to ask their Indonesian colonial subjects to contribute money for the celebration of the centenary celebrations of the Dutch liberation from French occupation at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, had published his famous article 'Als ik eens Nederlander was' ('If only I were a Netherlander'), pointing out the political ineptitude of such a request at such a time, and exposing the moral bankruptcy of Dutch rule (Scherer, 1985: 89-93; Penders, 1977: 232-34).

Given the volatility of current political developments in Indonesia and the need to rethink the relationship between the centre and periphery as the republic prepares to enter the twenty-first century,[2] it may be useful to contemplate what lessons Indonesia can learn from its own history of anti-colonial struggle in the pre-war period and the way these may parallel what the East Timorese themselves have experienced in the two decades since the Indonesian invasion of



Figure 1. East Timor

December 1975. This article will look first at the impact of 'development' in the pre-war Indies and post-1975 East Timor, and then consider the ways in which religion and language have contributed to the deepening of a specific Indonesian and East Timorese nationalist consciousness in the 'era of national awakening' (*jaman kebangkitan nasional*) and the post-1988 youth movement (*intifada*) in East Timor.

Colonialism and development: from 'opbouw' to 'pembangunan'

Both the late Dutch colonial state in the pre-war Netherlands Indies/Indonesia, and the Suharto regime in occupied East Timor have taken for granted their entitlement to rule. Both, however, have sought to dress this rule up in the language of development and 'good government'.

For the Dutch, this approach was principally shaped by the Ethical policy (1901-1930s), which drew its inspiration from Queen Wilhelmina's (r.1890-1948) 1901 speech from the throne which stated that, 'as a Christian power, the Netherlands is obliged to carry out government policy in the Indies in the consciousness that the Netherlands has a moral duty to the people of these regions' (Doel, 1996: 157). This policy expressed a willingness of the late Dutch colonial state to involve itself in the economic and social affairs of the archipelago in the name of rational efficiency, and give priority to 'development' (*opbouw* lit: 'upbuilding'). It was a time of improved health care, extended education, expansion of communications facilities, irrigation, economic and social infrastructure, and the beginnings of transmigration from Java to the outer islands (which commenced in 1902 with the first settlements in Lampung [South Sumatra]). All this, however, brought as many benefits to Dutch commercial interests as to the Indonesians themselves, and was heavily dependent on the rising demand for colonial products on world markets. When, in the early 1920s, the prices of these products fell, Dutch conservatives began to criticize the Ethici for having encouraged the growth of the Indonesian nationalist movement by training a new generation of disaffected intellectuals. Dutch colonial policy now started moving in a more repressive and reactionary direction. So much so that, by the time Governor-General Bonifacius Cornelis de Jonge, a former Minister of War and director of Royal Dutch Shell (then Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij, the Batavian Petroleum Company), took office in 1931, the forces of reaction were firmly in the ascendant. De Jonge's administration (1931-36) saw the internment or domestic exile (within Indonesia) of most of the Indonesian nationalist leadership, and final abandonment of the liberal initiatives. Ideas of self-government for the Indies, such as those proposed by Governor-General J.P. van Limburg Stirum (in office, 1916-21) and progressive colonial reformers, following the end of the

Figure 2. Governor-General Bonifacius Cornelis de Jonge.
Photo Iconographisch Bureau, 's-Gravenhage

first World War, were now rejected outright, a rejection epitomized by de Jonge's 1936 statement, made shortly before his departure, that:

> I consider that now we have worked here [. . .] for 300 years, another 300 may well have to elapse before the Indies will perhaps be ripe for some form of independence (Doel, 1996: 244).

With the onset of the Great Depression in the 1930s, it became clear that Western business interests, in particular the estate sector (coffee, sugar, etc.), would be protected at the expense of local producers (O'Malley, unpublished: 60-89). These were the years in which the Dutch fascist leader, Anton Adriaan Mussert (1894-1946), found his most zealous following in the Dutch colonies, and in which even a proposal as moderate as that of the July 1936 Sutarjo 'Petition' asking for a conference to prepare dominion status for Indonesia in ten years' time, along the lines of the Philippine Commonwealth (1935-42), was dismissed by the Dutch authorities as unrealistic (Penders, 1977: 141-47; Cribb, 1992: 456). Already, in his defence speech at his 1930 Bandung trial, Sukarno, the future first President of Indonesia (1945-67), had warned the Dutch of the impending Pacific War in which a triumphant Japan would be their nemesis (Soekarno, 1956: 163-74), but the increasingly conservative Netherlands Indies government had paid no heed. What had they to fear from a bunch of agitators, who had no genuine following, in their view, amongst the ordinary Indonesian people? Besides, how could they speak for 'Indonesia', when, given the archipelago's huge ethnic diversity, the very concept of a unified country was meaningless? No, if the Dutch left, the Netherlands Indies would descend into chaos: one ethnic group would turn against another and the carefully crafted *rust en orde* ('peace and order') of the colonial state would be ripped apart by endless political vendettas.

When one turns to Indonesia's own record in East Timor following its 7 December 1975 invasion, much the same rhetoric and practice are in evidence. Like the Dutch, Indonesian officials have consistently justified their intervention on the grounds that they were there in order to restore 'peace and order'. As one senior Indonesian Army officer put it:

> [T]he people had no choice but to join Indonesia. The territory [after the outbreak of the August 1975 civil war and the withdrawal of the Portuguese colonial administration to Ataúro] was experiencing chaos and there was massive fighting going on between Fretilin and the other [political] groups . . . it was one big bloody affair. For Fretilin, anyone for integration and against Fretilin was caught and executed. It was in this situation that Indonesia intervened. Thus, integration was undertaken not due to any particular ideology, but more for the personal

> and physical security of the people, largely brought about by the actions of Fretilin through its stronger firepower and cruel methods. In view of this, the safety and security aspects were critical in understanding the East Timor affair . . . (Bilveer Singh, 1995: 67).

Once this phase of military repression of what the Indonesian army termed the GPK (*Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan*, 'Security Disrupter Gangs') had been 'successfully' completed by the early 1980s (at the cost of around 200,000 lives, between a quarter and a third of the pre-1975 population),[3] Jakarta introduced its own version of the Ethical policy. This policy was associated with the ten years of Mário Viegas Carrascalão's governorship (1982-92), when around US$600 million (nearly US$1,000 for every surviving East Timorese man, woman, and child) was supposedly spent on development projects, with particularly large sums going on infrastructure (roads, ports) and administrative facilities. By 1990, some 50,000 East Timorese had graduated from Indonesian-language high schools, and a further 1,000 or more had studied at the territory's two technical colleges (Fatumaca and Dili) or had been to universities in inner Indonesia, a far higher ratio than the estimated 0.25 per cent of the indigenous Timorese population who benefited from Portuguese-language further education (and hence admittance to *assimilado/civilizado* status) under the Portuguese in the early 1970s (Weatherbee, 1966: 684; Saldanha, 1994: 242-53, 279-84).

Like the Dutch Ethical policy, however, there were strong indications that infrastructural development and extension of administrative facilities were as beneficial to the business interests of the occupying colonial power as to the indigenous population. Whereas Governor-General de Jonge had arrived in the Indies in the early 1930s with strong links with Holland's principal oil company, the Indonesian generals (Murdani, Dading Kalbuadi, and Adolf Sahala Rajagukguk), who presided over the military conquest of East Timor in the mid to late 1970s, looked after their own commercial interests through joint control of the Chinese-run corporation PT Denok Hernandes International. Now (post-1989) called PT Batara Indra, this quickly established a monopoly over sales of coffee, sandalwood, and marble production, as well as burgeoning interests in real estate, freight, tourism, entertainment, and sugar (Aditjondro, 1994: 17, 31; Mubyarto and others, 1991: 48-49).

The economic activities of the Indonesian military were always camouflaged, however, under the showy conceit of 'development' (*pembangunan*). By the mid-1990s, this had been institutionalized in the so-called 'Territorial Operation' (*Operasi Teritorial* or *Opster*), which involved soldiers in local building projects, the 'prosperity approach' having by then supposedly superseded the more straightforward demands of security (Saldanha, 1994: 175, 177, 324; Mubyarto and others, 1991: 60-62). In much the same fashion that late Dutch colonial officials brushed off the attacks of the Indonesian nationalists and Dutch liberals

in the pre-Depression era by reference to the ever-growing colonial economy, Indonesian officials, charged with defending their country's record in East Timor against Western countries, now stressed that Indonesia had done more for East Timor in twenty years than the Portuguese had done in four and a half centuries.[4] What both conveniently failed to mention, however, was that the cost of this economic development often fell on the poorest — indigenous — sections of the population. In the East Timorese case, the monopoly run by the army-linked PT Batara Indra conglomerate forced coffee producers to sell their crop at less than a third of world prices (US$ 0.67 instead of US$2.20 per kilogram) (UNGA, unpublished: 3; Mubyarto and others, 1991: 48-50), and agricultural lands, temporarily abandoned due to the fighting, were taken over for use as transmigrant sites for inner island Indonesians or for coffee production without so much as a cent in compensation to the original owners (Aditjondro, 1994: 17-18, 26, 31, 41 n.2).

A similar situation prevailed in the pre-war Netherlands Indies, where the indigenous Indonesian population paid a far higher proportion of their income in taxes than the wealthier Dutch and Chinese, a burden which seems to have increased as the Depression deepened in the 1930s (Kahin, 1970, 25-27). At the same time, although there were great regional variations (smallholder production in the Outer Islands, for example, continued to play a significant role in non-oil exports, and Java remained a net importing area), the fact that exports were running at twice the rate of imports by 1940 seemed to indicate — for the Indonesian nationalists at least — that the colonial relationship with Holland was a fundamentally exploitative one (Kahin and Kahin, 1995: 20, 246 n.1).

The development of educational facilities under the Dutch Ethical policy, and the Indonesian policy of *pembangunan* in East Timor, have also had similar political results, producing a new generation of educated youth, with minimal local job opportunities, mastery of a foreign language, which has given them access to a world beyond their homeland, and the capacity to reflect on their colonial predicament. Throughout the late 1980s, even as Indonesia prepared to 'open' East Timor, the number of East Timorese job seekers unable to be absorbed into a workforce now dominated by 'outsiders' continued to rise. Whereas 21 per cent had got jobs in 1983, by 1987, only 3.4 per cent of the estimated 4,707 job seekers had found employment. Indeed, the total number of employment opportunities created by the whole Indonesian fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1983-89) was a pitiful 1,675, just under 4 per cent of what would have been necessary to find jobs for all school leavers in that period. Neither private companies nor local government were able to absorb this new generation of bright and educated young Timorese, while the monopolistic practices of the military-dominated companies had effectively 'closed off' whole sectors of the modern economy to East Timorese school leavers and graduates (Mubyarto and others, 1991: 58). 'What's the use of school if there's no way of

getting a decent job?' said one, 'These days [1990] all office jobs are closed to us. If the Regional Office Head [*Kakanwil*] in a [local government] department is a newcomer [i.e. an Indonesian], he will only be interested in having his relatives, or, at least, people from the same region, working in his office' (Mubyarto and others, 1991: 55).

Much the same sense of disempowerment and frustration was felt by the tiny handful of pre-war Indonesians, who had graduated from Dutch high schools and universities. In 1940 — just over a year before the collapse of Dutch rule — only 7 per cent (221 out of 3,039) higher-ranking civil service positions were held by Indonesians. Ten years earlier, a Dutch government commission had found that 'about twice as many pupils graduated with Western education as jobs could be found for' and the situation was deteriorating all the time (Kahin and Kahin, 1995: 21). It was this rising tide of frustration amongst educated Indonesian youth which led to increasing support in the late 1920s and early 1930s for the non-co-operating nationalists (i.e. those who were holding out for 100 per cent *merdeka* [independence] from the Dutch), in particular Sukarno's PNI. This found voice in the October 1928 Youth Oath (*Sumpah Pemuda*) (Indonesia's national anthem, 'Indonesia Raya', was also composed for this All-Indonesia Youth Congress), which formally adopted Indonesia as the framework for the struggle against the Dutch, and affirmed that they were one people (*bangsa Indonesia*), with one language (*Bahasa Indonesia*), and one homeland (*tanah Indonesia*). Seventeen years later, the successor generation of these young inter-war nationalists, the so-called *pemuda*, would be instrumental in spearheading the declaration of independence (17 August 1945), and flocking in their tens of thousands to join the armed revolutionary units which endeavoured to defend that independence against the returning Dutch (Anderson, 1972).

In East Timor, many of the same processes which led to the emergence of an urban-based nationalist youth movement in the late colonial Indies/Indonesia, were (and still are) also at work. Foreign occupation, economic exploitation, cultural and social marginalization, unemployment, all conspired to forge a new sense of Timorese nationalism amongst the educated youth of Dili and other urban centres. In East Timor, however, to an even greater extent than the pre-war Netherlands Indies (where the economic role of the Chinese was increasingly resented, but where the proportion of Chinese, Arabs, and other foreign 'Asiatics' to the total indigenous population was much smaller), the sense of frustration was exacerbated by the presence of a large number of newcomers, migrants from other parts of Indonesia. Amongst these, the Bugis and Makassarese from South Sulawesi were especially resented given their dominance, by the early 1990s, of the territory's retail trade. Resented too were the ever-growing numbers of Indonesian civil servants who, came to be known wryly as the 'Battalion 702', the numbers referring to their leaving for work

early in the morning [7], not bringing any benefit to the local economy [0], and then going home early in the afternoon [2]) (Mubyarto and others, 1991: 54).

In a moving personal memoir, one young East Timorese (now in exile in Australia), Donaciano Gomes, has described his own path to political activism:

> It was in 1983-4 that I met someone who had become a member of the guerrilla resistance while living in a village. He was later captured by the Indonesian forces, subjected to terrible torture, and then sent as a political prisoner to Ataúro Island [off the northern coast of East Timor]. He was dead within the year. Naturally, I was influenced by these events. Who could not have been? [. . .] For me, growing up in East Timor was a deeply tragic experience (Carey and Bentley, 1995: 107).

Donaciano went on to describe how he and his friends were involved in planning and carrying out the demonstration at the time of Pope John Paul II's visit to East Timor in October 1989, an action which later forced him into exile after a period of imprisonment and torture at the hands of the Indonesian security forces (Carey and Bentley, 1995: 107-08). Other demonstrations followed: for example, the 17 January 1990 protest during the visit to Dili of US Ambassador John Monjo; the 4 September 1990 incident during the fiftieth anniversary celebration of the diocese of Dili; and, most bloody of all, Santa Cruz on 12 November 1991, when Indonesian troops opened fire killing an estimated 270 people and wounding 382, with a further 250 subsequently declared 'missing' (Amnesty International, 1994: 13; Paz é Possivel em Timor-Leste, 1992: 3). All of these involved young Timorese, who were now emerging as a political force in their own right, the heart of civil resistance to the Indonesian occupation, complementing the armed guerrilla resistance in the mountains.

The significance of this youth movement was recognized both by the Indonesians and the Fretilin leadership. In a speech remarkably similar in tone to that of Governor-General de Jonge, half a century earlier, General Murdani, then Indonesian Defence Minister (in office, 1988-93), lashed out against the young East Timorese protesters following the Monjo incident:

> Don't dream about having [an independent] state of TimTim [Timor Timur, i.e. East Timor]. There is no such thing! There have been bigger rebellions,[5] there have been greater differences of opinion with the government than the small number calling themselves Fretilin, or whoever their sympathisers are here. We will crush them all! I repeat we will crush them all! (Murdani, 1990: 14-15).

At his trial in May 1993, Xanana Gusmão also underscored the importance of the East Timorese youth, stressing that 'a people that knows itself cannot be reduced, cannot be subjected':

> We know we cannot hope for a military victory, but the underground resistance is more active today than it has been at any time during the past fifteen years [1975-90] of war. There are organized groups in every village and the youth [now] feel involved in the struggle for independence . . . actually, for us, just to resist is already to have won, and if the Indonesians imagine that by exterminating Falintil [*Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste*, Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor], they will put an end to the war, they are very much mistaken (Defert, 1992: 204, quoting Domm, 1990).

The forging of a closer sense of national identity amongst the younger generation of East Timorese was greatly assisted by the development of a national language (Tetun) and the influence of the Catholic Church, an influence already evidenced by the importance of Church-related events as the foci for political demonstrations in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Here the parallels with pre-war Indonesia, especially the still controversial contribution of political Islam to the independence struggle, become even more interesting, and it is to these that we will now turn in this final section.

Forging a nation: the role of religion and language

The founding of the *Budi Utomo* ('Noble Endeavour') association amongst the young Javanese students at the Medical College in Batavia (Jakarta) on 20 May 1908 under the direction of Dr Wahidin Sudiro Husodo (1857-1917) is often regarded as the beginning of the period of national awakening in Indonesia, but it was not, in fact, till the development of Sarekat Islam (SI) after 1912 that Indonesia had a genuine popular movement, one which could appeal for support from a broad section of the population. It aimed at the promotion of Islam and a commercial spirit amongst Indonesians particularly in the context of rivalry with the Chinese, whose penetration of the *batik* industry had led, via the Sino-Javanese Kong Sing (mutual aid organization), to the Islamic Traders' Association (Sarekat Dagang Islam) from whence the later SI sprang (Shiraishi, 1990: 39-40). Claiming a peak membership of some two million at the end of the first World War, SI used Islam as a rallying point and identifier for the indigenous population against the non-Islamic Dutch and Chinese, much in the same way that the Javanese prince, Dipanagara (1785-1855), had used the appeal

of Islam against the Dutch and their Indonesian allies during the Java War (1825-30) when he had spoken about the need to *mangun luhuripun Agami Islam ing Tanah Jawa sedaya* ('to raise the high state of the Islamic religion [i.e. moral order in general] throughout the whole land of Java') in the face of the colonial undermining of Javanese values and culture (Carey, 1974: 285; Carey, 1987: 279-81).

Although SI was later shipwrecked as a political force in the early 1920s after its infiltration by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the struggle within its ranks between Marxists and Islamicists, it left a critical legacy for the later secular nationalist movement. Sukarno, who had been deeply influenced by the SI leader, Haji Umar Said Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934), in whose house he had boarded while a student of the Dutch High School (HBS) in Surabaya, developed his all-inclusive nationalist theories, which attempted to weave Islam, Marxism, and Nationalism together in a coherent whole, against the background of the SI experience, and spoke of the inevitable struggle between the 'brown' and the 'white' front. It is true that despite Sukarno's best endeavours, secular nationalism, Communism, and Islam never transcended their inherent differences and later developed their own paths to an independent Indonesia, but the resonance of the SI movement remained important. The more widespread use of Indonesian (*Bahasa Indonesia*) as the vehicular language of the Indonesian nationalist movement also owed a great deal to the SI experience. Before the first World War, Javanese and Dutch had been used by the educated élite as the principal languages of communication: Budi Utomo, for example, despite its early adoption of Malay, remained throughout its life (1908-35) a quintessentially Javanese organization with branches outside Java principally amongst Javanese soldiers serving in outer island garrisons. The advent of SI thus marked a change in the nature of proto-nationalist political movements in Indonesia with the introduction of more Westernized organizational structures and the greater use of the non-élite *Bahasa Indonesia* (Shiraishi, 1990: ch. 2).

When one turns to East Timor, it is clear that the East Timorese Catholic Church has played a similarly significant role to political Islam in early twentieth-century Indonesia in fostering a specific sense of East Timorese identity after 1975. Forged initially in the bonds which developed between a handful of priests who, like the Portuguese Father Leoneto do Rego, went with Fretilin to the mountains in 1975-76, and the populations of the guerrilla zones (Dunn, 1983: 307-08), it had grown by the late 1980s into a broad and many-sided relationship, which provided an essential moral dimension to the guerrilla struggle (Archer, 1995: 120-33). Xanana, for example, stressed in his September 1990 interview with Robert Domm how the Timorese clergy 'had played an indirect role, strengthening patriotic consciousness [so that] the people had [developed] an enormous trust in the Church. They feel that it isn't isolated from their suffering, but in solidarity with them' (Domm, unpublished). This

solidarity is especially noticeable in the way in which the Church has cared for the wives, widows, children, and orphans of the Timorese resistance fighters, principally through the institution of the *colégios*, Catholic centres consisting of a parish church, a convent for priests, lay brothers, and nuns, a boarding school for boys or girls, and a large tract of land partly rented out to local farmers and partly cultivated by the students themselves to grow food for their school kitchen (Aditjondro, 1994: 28, 42 n.13). An interesting parallel can be drawn out here with the Islamic boarding school or *pesantrèn* in Java, which played such a critical role during both the Java War (1825-30) (Carey, 1987: 302-11), and the Revolution (1945-49) (Soejatno, 1974: 100-04; Stange, unpublished: 131).

This network of *colégios* and Church centres caring for the families of resistance fighters also played an interesting role in keeping alive a knowledge of Portuguese language and customs (Lewis, 1993: 118). For a younger Timorese generation denied access to such knowledge in Indonesian schools and a latter-day colonial society dominated by the alien culture of (mainly Javanese) inner island Indonesia, the Timorese Church offered a unique cultural and spiritual space. Here not only was the Lusophone inheritance of the pre-1975 era honoured, but respect was also shown for pre-Christian belief systems (e.g. the local veneration for heirlooms [*lulik*]). The iconography of the Catholic Church with its crucifixes, statues of the Blessed Virgin, grottoes, and *via dolorosa* structures, served in some ways as substitutes for the multifarious forms of ancestor worship and *lulik* veneration which had become increasingly difficult to carry out in Timor because of their potential association (in Indonesian eyes) with Fretilin gatherings (Aditjondro, 1994: 35).

Portuguese, previously the language of oppression in the colonial era, now acquired the cachet of the language of resistance, even though few of the post-1975 generation had the opportunity to study it properly. Abolished from public and private schools in the early 1980s, along with its use in the liturgy, it had become, by the late 1980s, the vehicle of clandestine communication *par excellence* between the older generation of resistance leaders and student militants both in East Timor and abroad, as well as in Timorese Church circles. This development has recently (28 November 1995) been assisted by the launch of the new Portuguese Asiasat-2 satellite, which can relay Portuguese-language radio and TV broadcasts to East Timor, a development spurred by the resolution of the first All-Inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue at Burg Schlaining in Austria in June 1995 on the need to preserve the cultural identity and Lusophone inheritance of the East Timorese people (*Diário de Notícias*, 28 November 1995; *Timor Link*, 33, [June 1995,] 1-2).

At the same time, Tetun has taken its place as the popular language of Timorese national identity, a lingua franca which, by the late 1980s, had condemned most other Timorese vernacular languages, of which there were about

thirty before the Indonesian invasion, to virtual extinction. Ironically, the actions of the Indonesian army in East Timor also accelerated this process of Tetunization. Their policy of driving all the surrendered East Timorese into 'resettlement camps' after the 1977-78 'encirclement and annihilation' campaign against the remaining Fretilin strongholds in the mountains, had forced the very diverse populations of the camps, many of whom hailed from different parts of the country, to use Tetun as the principal language of communication rather than rely on their own vernaculars (Cox and Carey, 1995: 42). Although very different in context, a somewhat similar process can be discerned in the late colonial Indies, where the development of premier educational facilities in Java attracted students from all over the archipelago and speeded the adoption of *Bahasa Indonesia* as a national language at the expense of regional dialects (Nagazumi, 1972: 72). In the case of East Timor, however, the role of the Church was also important, for it was on the recommendation of the East Timorese religious that the Vatican permitted the use of Tetun in the liturgy when, in October 1981, Portuguese was banned by the Indonesian authorities (Carey and Bentley, 1995: 12; Marcos, 1995: 130ff.).

The East Timorese Church, in fact, benefited from an unusual and privileged relationship with Rome. Because East Timor was the subject of an international dispute (the official Vatican line was that 'East Timor had left Portugal but had not yet joined Indonesia'), the Vatican did not attach the diocese to the Bishops' Conference of Indonesia, but administered it directly from Rome, via the Pro-Nuncio's office in Jakarta (Archer, 1995: 126). This arrangement, which remains in force to this day (1996), means that, throughout the Indonesian occupation, the Catholic Church was the *only* local institution that communicated independently with the outside world, maintaining connections with an international structure, which allowed it a certain independence from the Indonesian authorities. As a result, during the 1980s and 1990s, the Church was able, to a far greater extent than any other Timorese institution (with the possible exception of the resistance), to defend threatened individuals and threatened values. Both the first post-invasion Apostolic Administrator, Mgr Costa Lopes, and his successor Mgr (post-1988, Bishop) Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, have won great popular respect for their attempts to protect individuals against human rights abuses. But they tread a very fine line between the policy of the Vatican, which has consistently feared that too active a sympathy for East Timor might provoke a political or religious backlash against the Church in Indonesia (where there are some five million Catholics), and the demands of the younger nationalists in East Timor, who would like Belo to swing the Church publicly and unequivocally behind the nationalist movement. It is significant here that nearly all the principal demonstrations in East Timor itself, especially those organized by the student resistance, have had Church-related events as their focus: e.g. the papal mass of 12 October 1989, the 4 September 1990 fiftieth

anniversary celebrations of the diocese of Dili, and, of course, the 12 November 1991 memorial service at the Santa Cruz cemetery.

Conclusions

Space does not permit a more detailed consideration of the parallels between the *jaman kebangkitan* in Indonesia (1908-42) and the post-1975 process in East Timor which has so markedly deepened a sense of Timorese nationhood. But, amongst the other areas which might be considered are: first, the development (from October 1943) of the *Pembela Tanah Air* ('Protectors of the Fatherland') Indonesian volunteer army, trained by the Japanese, which, by the end of the war, had 37,000 men in Java and about 20,000 in Sumatra, and which would later, with the addition of sections of the ex-Dutch colonial army (Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger, KNIL), form the core of the post-1945 army of the Indonesian Republic, the *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*; and the development, from the August 1975 civil war, of the Falintil in East Timor, which also grew out of a colonially trained force, but which developed significantly as a guerrilla army after the collapse of conventional resistance structures following the fall of the Mt Matebian redoubt in late 1979. Second, one might compare the often uneasy relationship between the civilian politicians and the military leaders, sometimes referred to in shorthand as the tension between *diplomasi* (diplomacy) and *perjuangan* (military struggle) by historians, in Indonesia, and the way in which these tensions shaped the politics of the Revolution (1945-49); and the situation in East Timor, where Falintil veterans, the student-led Clandestine Civilian Resistance Front (now thought to number some 3,000 in East Timor and Indonesia, UNGA, unpublished: 2), and the Church under the leadership of Bishop Belo, all have different priorities in terms of the anti-colonial struggle and different styles of leadership. Finally, one might look at the way in which both the Indonesian and East Timorese nationalist movements have thrown up their own political terms to describe the social specifics of their revolutions: one thinks here of the word *marhaen*, which was adopted by Sukarno in the late 1920s to describe the large numbers of Indonesians, especially peasant farmers, who, although poverty-stricken and oppressed by colonial capital, were still owners of their own means of production (i.e. small plots of land and a few tools) (Cribb, 1992: 286); and the use of the term *maubere*. Derived from the Mambai word for 'my brother', 'my friend' (feminine: *bibere* = 'my sister'), and employed in the Portuguese colonial time to denote everything that was contemptible, in the eyes of town-dwelling Portuguese and East Timorese *civilizados*, about the ignorant and impoverished highland peasantry, it came to symbolize the post-1974 national struggle for the emancipation of the rural



Figure 3. Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo.
Photo Carlos Reyes-Manzo/Andes Press Agency

inhabitants of East Timor and their transformation into the true 'sons' and 'daughters' of an independent state (Marcos, 1995: 120-22).

One day Indonesians will have greater access to what has been done in their name in distant Timor, and the East Timorese themselves will be able to write their own history and develop their own perspectives on their struggle for nationhood and independence. Until that day comes, both peoples can perhaps usefully reflect on the processes by which Indonesia became free of the Dutch earlier this century, a freedom, which, from the vantage point of the late 1930s, seemed almost impossible of attainment.

Trinity College
Oxford OX1 3BH

Notes

1. This article was originally a paper given at the Public Education and Dialogue Conference on 'East Timor: Its Future in the Asia Pacific' at the University of Technology, Sydney, 21-24 June 1996. A much abbreviated version has been published as 'To struggle for freedom: Indonesia yesterday, East Timor today', *Inside Indonesia* (Northcote, NSW), 49, 1997, 26-27. The author would like to thank Dr Gerrit Knaap (Koninklijk Instituut, Leiden), Dr Gerry van Klinken (Research School of Pacific and Asian History, Australian National University), and Dr Nigel Phillips (SOAS) for their help.
2. For a useful discussion of the political and constitutional implications of the unequal economic relationship between Java and the 'Outer Islands', see Booth (1992: 32-47.) The recent (March 1996) riots in the Freeport-McMoran copper mining towns of Tembagapura and Timika have quickened debate in Indonesia on the regional autonomy issue and the need to regulate the inflow of settlers to the far less developed provinces, like Irian Jaya, from other parts of Indonesia, see K.T. Arasu, 'Irian riots, hostage taking raises autonomy issue', *Reuters*, 14 March 1996, quoting Dewi Fortuna Anwar and Dr Amir Santoso.
3. For a careful analysis of the demographic losses in the period 1975-81 following the Indonesian invasion, see Defert (1992: 147-51 and Fig.8), who cites a low (based on Indonesian statistics) of 170,000, and a high (based on Church statistics) of 308,000. The pre-invasion population of East Timor numbered around 696,000, see Defert (1992: 148). Indonesian military casualties have not been publicized, but it is rumoured that they lost the equivalent of two divisions (i.e. 16,000 men). The nearest equivalent, during the late Dutch colonial period (i.e. *c.* 1870-1942), to this level of population loss, was the Aceh War (1873-1903), when 100,000 Acehnese (out of a total population of just over 600,000) perished, see Cribb (1992: 3); Bezemer (1921: 19). Dutch military casualties numbered some 12,000, a figure which included a large number of Ambonese and other Indonesian troops.
4. See Alatas (1992: 9) ('more asphalt roads, bridges, schools, hospitals and health centres, public markets and places of worship have been built in the 16 years since integration than during the entire 450 years of colonial rule').
5. Murdani is here referring to the 'Communist' uprising in Madiun in September 1948; the Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS) secessionist revolt in Ambon in 1950; the Darul Islam movements in West Java (1948-62), South Sulawesi (1952-65), and Aceh (1953-59); the federalist PRRI-Permesta uprisings in West Sumatra and North Sulawesi in 1958-61; and the crushing of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)

following the 30 September 1965 *coup d'état*. Even as he was speaking, a major army operation was going on against Hasan Ditiro's Free Aceh (Aceh Merdeka) movement, 1989-91, which left an estimated 2,000 dead, see Kell (1995: 74-75).

References

Aditjondro, G. 1994. *East Timor: an Indonesian intellectual speaks out. Edited by H. Feith, E. Baulch, and P. Walsh.* Canberra: Australian Council for Overseas Aid. (ACFOA Development Dossier 33.)

Alatas, A. 1992. East Timor: de-bunking the myths around a process of decolonization. [Address to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 20 February 1992.] *Indonesian News* (Information Department, Indonesian Embassy, London), XX (28) (20 March 1992), Special Issue.

Amnesty International. 1994. *East Timor: who is to blame? Statement before the UN Special Committee on Decolonization — July 1994.* London: AI International Secretariat.

Anderson, B.R.O'G. 1972. *Java in a time of revolution, occupation and resistance, 1944-1946.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Archer, R. 1995. The Catholic Church in East Timor. (*In* Carey, P., *and* Bentley, G.C. (ed.). *East Timor at the crossroads: the forging of a nation.* London: Cassell, 120-33.)

Bezemer, T.J. 1921. *Beknopte Encyclopedie van Nederlandsch-Indië.* 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff.

Bilveer Singh. 1995. *East Timor, Indonesia, and the world: myths and realities.* Singapore: Singapore Institute of International Affairs.

Booth, A. 1992. Can Indonesia survive as a unitary state? *Indonesia Circle*, 58, 32-47.

Carey, P. 1974. Javanese histories of Dipanagara: the Buku Kedhung Kebo, its authorship and historical importance. *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, CXXX (2-3), 259-88.

Carey, P. 1987. Satria and santri: some notes on the relationship between Dipanagara's kraton and religious supporters during the Java War (1825-30), (*In* Alfian, T.I., *and others* (ed.). *Dari babad dan hikayat sampai sejarah kritis: kumpulan karangan dipersembahkan kepada Prof. Dr. Sartono Kartodirdjo.* Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 270-318.)

Carey, P., *and* Bentley, G.C. (ed.). 1995. *East Timor at the crossroads: the forging of a nation.* London: Cassell.

Cox, S., *and* Carey, P. 1995. *Generations of resistance: East Timor.* London: Cassell.

Cribb, R. 1992. *Historical dictionary of Indonesia.* Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press.

Defert, G. 1992. *Timor Est. Le génocide oublié: droit d'un peuple et raisons d'états*. Paris: Harmattan.

Doel, H.W. van den. 1996. *Het rijk van Insulinde*. Amsterdam: Prometheus.

Domm, R. 1990. Timor rebels fight on with 'Unshakeable Morale', *The Age* (Melbourne), 25 October 1990.

Domm, R. Unpublished. Report from the mountains of East Timor: interview with resistance guerilla commander, Shanana [*sic*] Gusmao. [Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 'Background briefing', 28-30 October 1990.]

Dunn, J. 1983. *Timor: a people betrayed*. Milton (Queensland): Jacaranda Press.

Kahin, A.R., *and* Kahin, G.M. 1995. *Subversion as foreign policy. the secret Eisenhower and Dulles debacle in Indonesia*. New York: New Press.

Kahin, G.M. 1970. *Nationalism and revolution in Indonesia*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press Paperbacks.

Kell, T. 1995. *The roots of the Acehnese rebellion, 1989-1992*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.

Lewis, N. 1993. *An empire of the East: travels in Indonesia*. London: Jonathan Cape.

Marcos, A. 1995. *Timor timorense, com suas línguas, literaturas, lusofonia . . . .* Lisboa: Edições Colibri.

Mubyarto *and others*. 1991. *East Timor: the impact of integration. An Indonesian socio-anthropological study. Edited by P. Walsh*. Northcote (Australia): Indonesian Resources and Information Program (IRIP). [English translation and edition of an Indonesian-language study originally prepared for the Research Centre for Village and Regional Development, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, 1990.]

Murdani, L.B. 1990. Murdani's Dili speech: don't dream, or else . . . . *Inside Indonesia*, 23 (June 1990), 14-15. [Partial transcript of speech delivered by General L.B. ('Benny') Murdani in Dili to 400 officials on 3 February 1990.]

Nagazumi, A. 1972. *The dawn of Indonesian natonalism: the early years of the Budi Utomo, 1908-1918*. Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies. (I.D.E. Occasional Papers Series, 10.)

O'Malley, W.J. Unpublished. Indonesia in the Great Depression: a study of East Sumatra and Jogjakarta in the 1930's. [Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1977.]

Paz é Possivel em Timor-Leste. 1992. *East Timor: the Santa Cruz massacre/Timor Oriental: massacre de Santa Cruz*. Lisbon: A Paz é Possivel em Timor-Leste.

Penders, C.L.M. 1977. *Indonesia: selected documents on colonialism and nationalism, 1830-1942*. St Lucia: Queensland University Press.

Saldanha, J.M. de S. 1994. *Ekonomi politik pembangunan Timor Timur*. Jakarta: Sinar Harapan.

Scherer, S. P. 1985. *Keselarasan dan kejanggalan: pemikiran-pemikiran priayi nasionalis Jawa awal abad XX*. Jakarta: PT Sinar Agape. [Indonesian translation of 'Harmony and dissonance: early nationalist thought in Java', unpublished M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1975.]

Shiraishi, T. 1990. *An age in motion: popular radicalism in Java, 1912-1926*. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.

Soejatno. 1974. Revolution and social tensions in Surakarta, 1945-1950. [Trans. Ben Anderson.] *Indonesia*, 17, 99-112.

Soekarno. 1956. *Indonesia menggugat: pidato pembelaan Bung Karno dimuka Hakim Kolonial. Cetakan kedua*. Djakarta: Penerbitan S.K. Seno.

Stange, P. Unpublished. The Sumarah movement in Javanese mysticism. [Ph.D. thesis, Department of History, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1980.]

UNGA. Unpublished. UN General Assembly, East Timor. [Working paper prepared by the Special Committee on Decolonisation, 17 June 1996 (A/AC.109/2049).]

Weatherbee, D. 1966. Portuguese Timor: an Indonesian dilemma. *Asian Survey*, VI (12), 683-95.